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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DANILO PASCUAL,

CASE NO. 890062

Defendant-Appellant.
BASIS OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred upon this Court
pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of the Supreme Court and
§78-2-2(3)(J), Utah Code Annotated (1988).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Defendant-Appellant appeals from a jury verdict
finding him guilty of criminal homicide, murder in the second
degree, a first degree felony, rendered on the 8th day of
December, 1988, in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah.

Defendant-Appellant filed his Notice of

Appeal with the Supreme Court on February 17, 1989.
Pro Say Notice of Appeal.

This was a

Pursuant to a Motion For Resentencing,

Defendant-Appellant filed a Stipulation and Order authorizing the
Court to remand the case back to the Second Judicial District
Court, before the Honorable Stanton Taylor, for resentencing for
purposes of perfecting an Appeal.

The case was ordered remanded

on May 1, 1989. His second Notice of Appeal was filed September
20, 1989.
-1-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

The Court's failure to give an eye witness instruc-

tion was plain error and the defense counsel's failure to ask for
said instruction constituted a deficient performance that prejudiced the Defendant and denied him his 6th Amendment Right to
effective assistance of counsel*
2.

Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel

in violation of the 6th Amendment to the Untied States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah.
(a)

Defense counsel's failure to request an eyewit-

ness instruction was prejudicial error for reasons more specifically set forth in Issue I contained herein.

Further, because of

ineffective assistance of counsel, he was deprived of a fair
trial and, thus, his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated.
(b)

Defense Counsel's failure to object to instruc-

tion #10, Court Record @ pg. 81, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error.
(c) Appellant was denied effective assistance of
counsel when counsel formulated his theory of the case, presented
that theory to the jury, then abandoned that theory half-way
through Appellant's trial because he failed to properly
investigate his case prior to commencement of trial.
-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 25, 1988, Danilo Pascual, residing at 3268
Childs Street, Ogden, Utah, had friends over to his home and was
eating dinner at approximately 7:00 p.m. in the evening.

Jamie

Gomez and Jerry Garza drove by Pascual!s home, where Lawrence
Lucero, Ray Hane, Chris Mandoza and the Appellant were visiting.
Appellants friends were sitting on the front porch when Garza and
Gomez began shouting from the car window at Lucero. (T.T.Q pg.
494).

Apparantently these two groups of people, or at least

Lucero and Garza, were very angry with each other. (T.T.Q
pg.116).

Approximately ten minutes thereafter, the car went by

the porch again, Appellant being in his house but having heard
yelling from the car. (T.T. 495).

The individuals sitting on

the Appellants porch were Phillipino/Lucero group.

The individu-

als in the car were the Mexicans Cholos group.
The two individuals from the car went to the home of
Johnny Martinez, Jamie Gomez' uncle. (T.T.Q pg. 119)

They

recruited the help of Rumeldo Gomez, John Martinez and several
other people and approached the field close to Appellant's home.
(T.T.Q pg 121, 502)

Lawrence Lucero and Jerry Garza were appar-

ently enemies, Lucero having blamed Garza for an attack on
Lucerofs female cousin. (T.T.O pg. 412)

Lucero and the other

individuals at Appellant's home jumped off the porch and
approached the empty field adjacent to Appellant's home to meet
the on-coming group (T.T.O pg. 120)

More of the Gomez/Garza crowd

began to appear, to-wit: Joe Reyes, Rumeldo Gomez, Victor Abrego,
-3-

Larry Rodgregos and Johnny Martinez, among others. (T.T.Q pg.120)
Upon confrontation between the two groups of people,
Jerry Garza had in his possession a knife. (T.T.Q pg. 121).
Apparently someone from the other group of people had a bat.
(T.T.Q pg. 122). The group encountered blows against each other
and crossed the street towards Todd Salazar's house. (T.T.Q pg.
122). Sometime during the assault by each group on the other, the
Defendant obtained a shotgun from his bedroom and approached the
field holding the gun in the air. (T.T.Q pg. 500, 507). With the
Appellant were Ranaldo Hain, Lawrence Lucero, Chris Mendoza and
Franklin Lucero.

The fight moved from the field, across the

street and into the front yard area of Todd Salazar, the eventual
victim.
Involved in this fight were two distinct groups of
people.

One group of people, as referred during the defense

counsel's opening statement, were Central City Cholos, a Mexican
gang group.

(T.T.Q pgs. 73, 253). The other group of people

were referred to as the Phillipinos.

Although defense counsel

began the trial in an attempt to bring out the relationship
between the gangs and establish an intent to be afraid and for
the Appellant to justifiably defend himself, defense counsel
abandoned that strategy in the middle of the trial, thereby
clearly prejudicing the Appellant, and committing plain error.
Rulmedo Gomez testified that most of the people on the ground
during the fight were Rulmedo's people, to-wit: Cholos. (T.T.Q
pg. 170). His group had a bat and his group had a long knife.
-4-

Ranaldo Hane testified that Todd was on the corner of Childs,
across the street from his house, when he became involved in the
fight. (T.T.Q pg.412, 429). Evidently Todd and another individuals with him approached the Appellant and began swinging what
appeared to be a sharp object and hitting the Appellant.
pgs. 438,475).

(T.T.Q

Appellant then began to swing back with his shot

gun and apparently hit Salazar in the head.

As Todd's body

turned, the Appellant's gun went off, hitting Todd Salazar at an
angel to the back and subsequently killing him.
377).

(T.T.@ pgs. 511,

During the trial on the matter, virtually all the testi-

mony with regards to the Appellant's involvement in the gang
fight was eyewitness testimony.

No eyewitness cautionary

instruction was requested and no eyewitness cautionary instruction was given.
Also, the Prosecutor made continuing comments, during
opening statement and by calling Natalie Chase to the witness
stand, concerning Todd's background with regards to having a common law wife, a baby and another baby on the way.

Such remarks

were clearly inadmissible, irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
Defense counsel objected to the comments made by the prosecutor
with regards to Mr. Salazar's background and moral family
commitment, during an incamera recess with Judge Taylor.

Judge

Taylor sustained the objection, but no cautionary instruction was
given to the jury.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE I
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE AN EYE WITNESS INSTRUCTION
WAS PLAIN ERROR AND THE DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ASK
FOR SAID INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTED A DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE
THAT PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT AND DENIED HIM HIS 6TH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
On the facts of this case, it was plainly improper for
the trial Court not to have given a cautionary instruction to the
jury focusing its attention on the well-documented factors that
affect the reliability of eye witness testimony.

As noted in

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986),
The literature is replete with empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eye witness testimony.
And, although Long dealt with the actual identification of the
Defendant as the perpetrator of a crime, the same factors relied
upon by the Court in that case exist here.
Clearly, human perception is the inexact and human memory is both limited and fallible.

A more rigorous approach to

cautionary instructions, given the facts and circumstances of
this case, is appropriate.

Here the Appellant's theory of the

case was clear from the beginning of his trial.

Two groups of

people were involved in a gang war encounter (T.T.O pg. 73).
Appellant, in an attempt to prevent escalation of the fighting,
displayed a shot-gun.

The State's witnesses, members of one

group (T.T.Q pg. 170), testified that Salazar did not become
involved in the fight and never left his yard.

Defense witnesses

testified that Salazar in fact became involved in the fight and
-6-

in fact, attacked Appellant (T.T.@ pg. 432). Whether Appellant's
theory of the case was as an accidental shooting or justifiable
self defense, he relied upon the jury's understanding of the limits and fallibility of eye witness testimony.

Without the

instruction or expert testimony, the jury would not be aware of
the inherent problems with this kind of testimony.
The jury was never told that the process of perceiving
events and remembering them is not as simple or as certain as
turning on a camera and recording everything the camera sees on
tape or film for later replay.

Nor were they told that what wit-

nesses perceive and remember is the result of a much more complex
process, one that does not occur without involving the whole
person, and one that is profoundly affected by who we are and
what we bring to the event of perception.

Sue R. Buckhout,

Eyewitness Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 171, 17a (1975)
(reprinted from 231 Scientific American 23 Dec. 1974).
As stated in E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979), and
State v. Long, supra, 721 P.2d @ 488-489..
Research on human memory has consistently shown that
failures may occur and inaccuracies creep in at any
stage of what is broadly referred to as the "memory
process". This process includes the acquisition of
information, its storage, and its retrieval and communication to others. These stages have all been extensively studied in recent years, and a wide variety of
factors influencing each stage have been identified.
During the First acquisition stage, a wide array of factors have been found to affect the accuracy of an
individual's perception. Some of these are rather
obvious.
For example, the circumstances of the observation are
critical: the distance of the observer from the event,
-7-

the length of time available to perceive the event, the
amount of light available, and the amount of movement
involved. Buckhout, supra, at 17 3. However, perhaps
the more important factors affecting the accurancy of
one's perception are those factors originating within
the observer. One such limitation is the individual's
physical condition, including both obvious infirmities
as well as such factors as fatigue and drug or alcohol
use. Another limitation which can affect perception is
the emotional state of the observer. Contrary to much
accepted lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked
degree of stress, perceptual abilities are known to
decrease significantly. See, e.g., Woocher, supra, at
979 n.29.
A far less obvious limitation of great importance arises
from the fact that the human brain cannot receive and
store all the stimuli simultaneously presented to it.
This forces people to be selective in what they perceive
of any given event. See Woocher, supra, at 976-77. To
accomplish this selective perception successfully, over
time each person develops unconscious strategies for
determining what elements of an event are important
enough to be selected out for perception. The rest of
the stimuli created by the event are ignored by the
brain. These unconscious strategies of selective perception work quite well in our day-to-day lives to provide us with only the most commonly useful information,
but the strategies may result in the exclusion of information that will later prove important in a Court
proceeding.
Another mechanism we all develop to compensate our
inability to perceive all aspects of an event at once is
a series of logical inferences: if we see one thing, we
assume, based on our past experience, that we also saw
another that ordinarily follows. This way we can
"perceive" a whole event in our mind's eye when we have
actually seen or heard only portions of it. Id. at 9 80.
The implications of this memory strategy, for Court proceedings are similar to those of selective perception.
Other important factors that affect the accuracy of a
viewer's perception, and which are unique to each
observer, include the expectations, personal
experiences, biases, and prejudices brought by any individual to a given situation. Buckhout, supra, at
175-76. A good example of the effect of preconceptions
on the accuracy of perception is the well-documented
fact that identifications tend to be more accurate where
the person observing and the one being observed are of
the same race. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony
-8-

Research: System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36
J. Personality & Social Psych, 1546, 1550 (1978); Note,
Cross Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
Cornell L. Rev. 934 (1984); Bibicoff, supra, at 101.
The memory process is also subject to distortion in the
second or retention stage, when information that may or
may not have been accurately perceived is stored in the
memory. Research demonstrates that both the length of
time between the witnessf s experience and the recollection of that experience, and the occurrence of other
events in the intervening time period, affect the accuracy and completeness of recall. Just as in the perception stage, where the mind infers what occurred from what
was selected for perception, in the retention stage people tend to add extraneous details and to fill in memory
gaps over time, thereby unconsciouly constructing more
detailed, logical, and coherent recollections of their
actual experiences. Thus, as eyewitnesses wend their
way through the criminal justice process, their reports
of what was seen and heard tend to become "more
accurate, more complete and less ambiguous" in
appearance. Buckhout, supra, at 179. The implications
of this mental strategy for any criminal Defendant whose
conviction hinges on an eyewitness identification are
obvious. See Woocher, supra, at 98 3 n.53.
Research has also underminded the common notion that the
confidence with which an individual makes an identification is a valid indicator of the accuracy of the
recollection. K. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and
Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Their
Relationship?, 4 Law and Human Behavior 243 (1980);
Lindsay, Wells, Rumpel, Can People Detect Eyewitness
Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?,
66 J. Applied Psych. 79, 80-82 (1981); Bibicoff, supra,
at 104 n.35. If fact, the accuracy of an identification
is, at times, inversely related to the confidence with
which it is made. Buckhout, supra, at 184.
Finally, the retrieval stage of the memory process—when
the observer recalls the event and communicates that
recollection to others—is also fraught with potential
for distortion. For example, language imposes limits on
the observer. Experience suggests that few individuals
have such a mastery of language that they will not have
some difficulty in communicating the details and nuances
of the original event, and the greater the inadequacy,
the greater the likelihood of miscommunication. An
entirely independent problem arises when one who has
accurately communicated his recollection in a narrative
form is then asked questions in an attempt to elicit a
-9-

more complete picture of the event described. Those
asking such questions, by using a variety of subtle and
perhaps unconscious questioning techniques, can significantly influence what a witness "remembers" in response
to questioning. And as the witness is pressed for more
details, his responses become increasingly inaccurate.
See Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible
Eyewitness, 15 Jurimetrics J, 188 (1975). In addition,
research has documented an entirely different set of no
less significant problems that relate to the
suggestiveness of police lineups, showups, and photo
arrays. See, e.g., Buckhout, supra, at 179-87.
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors
are, for the most part, unaware of these problems.
People simply do not accurately understand the
deleterious effects that certain variables can have on
the accuracy of the memory process of an honest
eyewitness. See K. Deffenbacher & E. Loftus, Do Jurors
Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness
Behavior?, 6 Law and Human Behavior 15 (1982); J.
Brigham, R. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors
to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification, 7
Law and Human Behavior 19 (1983). Moreover, the common
knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to
documented research findings. See Loftus, supra, at
171-77.
Perhaps it is precisely because jurors do not appreciate
the fallibility of eyewitness testimony that they give
such testimony great weight. See Sanders, supra, at
189-90 n.6; Loftus, supra, at 8-19. In one notable
study involving a simulated criminal trial, 18% of the
jurors voted to convict the Defendant when there were no
eyewitnesses to the crime. However, when a credible
eyewitness was presented, 72% voted to convict. And,
suprisingly, even when presented with an eyewitness who
was quite thoroughly discredited by counsel, a full 6 8%
still voted to convict. 15 Jurimetrics J. at 189-90.
In one study which found a poor relationship between
witness confidence and accuracy of identification, the
researchers concluded, "(i)t is possible that the
jurors1 rate of belief is around 80% irrespective of the
actual rate of witness accuracy.: G. Wells, R. Lindsay,
T Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perception
in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. Applied Psych. 440,
447 (1970).
Appellant does not suggest that it was appropriate for
the Court to give the complete Telfaire (469 F.2d 552)(D.C. Cir.
-10-

1972) instruction as outined in State v. Long, supra. However,
Appellant does believe that he was entitled to an instruction
similar to the second component of Telfaire, to-wit: that which
addressed the issue of credibility of eyewitness testimony.
Appellant's entire defense hinged upon accident and/or
justification with regards to the shooting.

Virtually all of the

evidence admitted during his trial was introduced through eyewitness testimony: the kind of eyewitness testimony with which the
second component of the Telfaire instruction is concerned.

And

without having had the availability and benefit of an expert witness to explain the inherent dangers of eyewitness testimony, the
jury was left in the dark as to the complex process through which
witnesses perceive, and remember and recollect.
The Research outlined in Long and briefly set forth
herein confirm that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of the
following instruction:
The eyewitness testimony that you have heard was an
expression of belief or impression by the witness. To
find the Defendant not guilty, you need not find that
the eyewitness was insincere, but merely that the witness was mistaken in his (her) belief or impression.
Many factors affect the accuracy of eyewitness
testimony. In considering whether Defendant was justified in the shooting death of Todd Salazar, or whether
he was an aggressor or in the combat by agreement, you
should consider the following.
1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to
observe the criminal actor?
In answering this question, you should consider:
a) the length of time the witnesses observed the actor;
b) the distance between the witness and the actor;
c) the extent to which the actor's features were visible
-12-

and undisguised;
d) the light or lack of light at the place and time of
observation;
e) the presence (or) absence of distracting noises or
activity during the observation;
f) any other circumstances affecting the witness1
opportunity to observe the person committing the crime.
2) Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime?
In answering this question, you should consider whether
the witness' capacity was impaired by:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

stress or fright at the time of observation;
personal motivations, biases or prejudices;
uncorrected visual defects;
fatigue or injury;
drugs or alcohol.

You should also consider whether the witness is of a
different race than the criminal actor. Identification
by a person of a different race may be less reliable
than identification by a person of the same race.
3) Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the
criminal actor at the time of the crime?
In answering this question, you should consider whether
the witness knew that a crime was taking place during
the time he (she) observed the actor. Even if the witness had adequate opportunity and capacity to observe
the criminal actor, he (she) may not have done so unless
he (she) was aware that a crime was being committed.
4) Was the witness1 testimony concerning the Defendant
completely the product of his (her) own memory?
In answering this question, you should consider:
a) the length of time that passed between the witness1
original observation and his (her) testimony concerning
the Defendant;
b) the witness* (mental) capacity and state of mind at
the time of the events.
c) the witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions or
recollection given by other witnesses, to photographs or
newspaper accounts, or to any other information or
influence that may have affected the independence of his
(her) testimony.
d) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to
the crime, failed to identify the Defendant as the
-13-

aggressor in the fight or that the Defendant did not
engage in the fight by agreement.
e) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to
the crime, gave a description of the events that is
inconsistent with his (her) prior statements.
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the
Defendant is the person who committed the crime is on
the prosecution. If, after considering the evidence you
have heard from the prosecution and from the defense,
and after evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light
of the considerations listed above, you have a reasonable doubt about whether the Defendant committed the
crime and was justified, you must find him not guilty.
Instruction #3, Court Record at page 73, which deals
with the credibility of witnesses, is not sufficient to protect
the Appellant's due process right to a fair trial in this case.
Although this instruction vaguely touches on some concerns voiced
by the research community with regards to eyewitness testimony,
superimposed on all discussion of contested eyewitness testimony
is a failure to differentiate that function of credibility which
is deliberate and intended from capability and capacity which
encompass physical limitations of the testifying witness as an
actual, even though perhaps unintended, constituent of
invalidity.

The Court should not ignore the well documented

frequency of mistake which occurs in eyewitness testimony with
regard for what should be appropriate in the tough cases.

See

Annotation, Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert
Testimony on Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 46 A.L.R. 4th
1047 (1986), and Annotation Necessity of, and Prejudicial Effect
of Omitting Cautionary Instructions to Jury as to Reliability of
or Factors to be Considered in Evaluating Eyewitness
Identification and Testimony State Cases, 23 A.L.R. 4th 1089
-14-

(1983) .
The credibility instruction given to Appellant's jury
did not put the jury on notice that failures may occur and
inaccuracies creep in at any stage of the memory process; from the
circumstances surrounding the witnesses1 observation, such as
fatigue and drug or alcohol use; to the capacity of the human
brain to receive and store all the stimuli simultaneously presented to it, together with determining what elements of an event
are important enough to be selected out and which elements will
be ignored by the brain; to the complexities of human
perceptions, including expectations, personal experiences, biases
and prejudices; to the retention stage when people tend to add
extraneous details and fill in memory gaps; to the retrieval
stage when the observer recalls the event and communicates that
recollection to others.

This last stage of the memory process is

fraught with potential for distortion, especially the limitation
that language imposes on the observer.

Because the witnesses for

the defense, as well as the state!s witnesses, all expressed limited language skills, the reasons for requiring the Court to give
the above-mentioned cautionary instruction are enhanced.
Defendant was from the Phillipines and at least one of
his witnesses had been in this country, at most, only three years
(T.T.@ pg. 466). An interpreter was required for much of the
Defendant's case in chief. (T.T.Q pg. 509). As noted in State v.
Long, 721 P2d @ 489, "Experience suggests that few individuals
have such a mastery of language that they will
-15-

not have some

difficulty in communicating the details and nuances of the original event, and the greater the inadequacy, the greater the likelihood of miscommunication."

The problem is obviously enhanced

when the witness is not fluent in the language with which the
jury is experienced and understands.
Failure to give a cautionary eyewitness instruction was
plain error.

Also, defense counsel's failure to request same

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah.
ISSUE NO, II
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
(a) Defense counsel's failure to request an eyewitness
instruction was prejudicial error for reasons more specifically
set forth in Issue I contained herein.

Further, because of inef-

fective assistance of counsel, he was deprived of a fair trial
and, thus, his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution were violated.
The Utah Supreme Court, following constitutional
mandates, recognizes the right to effective assistance of
counsel.

State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976).

In a

recent decision, State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), the
Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the standard for
effective assistance of counsel established in Strickland vs.
-16-

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984): "A
Defendant who raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
must show both that his or her counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the result
would have been different."

A reasonable probability is defined

as "a possibility sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."

Strickland, 466 U.S. @ 694, 104 S. Ct.@ 2068.
Given the facts and circumstances of this case, defense

counselfs failure to request the cautionary instruction was
clearly not the result of reasonable professional judgment.

For

example, Jaime Gomez testified that his memory was bad because he
was running, and, as a result, just briefly saw the gun Defendant
possessed. (T.T.Q pg. 125). Yet he stated earlier that he saw
Appellant with the fun and in fact stopped to ask him why he had
it. (T.T.Q pg. 123)

Then again, he said he first noticed the gun

when Appellant hit Todd with it. (T.T.Q pg. 129). This is precisely the kind of eyewitness testimony with which researchers
have been concerned, to-wit: "in the retention stage, people tend
to add extraneous details and to fill in memory gaps over time,
thereby unconsciously constructing more detailed, logical, and
coherent recollections of their actual experiences.
489.

Long @ pg.

The jury should have been instructed with regards to this

information and Appellant had a right to have them so instructed.
Had the jury been given this information, the members thereof
would have been able to focus their attention on the factors that
-17-

affect eyewitness testimony.

Failure to request the instruction

should undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict against
the Appellant because when the circumstances surrounding the eyewitness testimony raise serious questions of reliability.
The record is replete with evidence that each "side" of
the fight in this case contained its own members, with each group
standing against the other. (T.T.O pgs. 170, 195, 253, 259-60,
423).

There was also evidence introduced by state and defense

eyewitnesses that Todd Salazar was involved in the fighting
(T.T.Q pgs. 188, 220, 242, 249, 412, 429, 432-33, 438, 501-2).
Under these circumstances an eyewitness instruction was critical,
not only to educate the jury, but to present the Defendant's
theory of the case.

Circumstances surrounding the group affilia-

tion and Appellant's assertion of justification and self-defense
raise grave concerns about the eyewitnesses reliability.

The

lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's omission in
requesting this instruction distinguishes this case from many of
the previous cases where ineffective assistance of counsel claims
were rejected.
b)

Defense Counsel's failure to object to instruction

#10, Court Record @ pg. 81, constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel and plain error.
Although defense counsel properly included the statutory
language contained in part of §76-2-402, U.C.A. (1974), defining
justifiable force (Ct Record @ pg. 85), Subsection 2(c) of that
section has been misstated in Instruction #10 and not addressed
-18-

at all in Instruction #13*
Instruction 13 reads as follows:
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution
for any offense based on the conduct. The defense of
justification may be claimed when the actor's conduct is
in defense of persons or property under the circumstances described as follows:
A person is justified in threatening or in using force
against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use
of unlawful force; however, a person is justified in
using force which is intended or likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury only if he reasonably believes
that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or to a third person or to prevent the commission of a foreseeable felony.
A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances listed above if he initially provokes the use
of force against himself with the intent to use force as
an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant.
Instruction #10 states:
You are instructed that in any prosecution for criminal
homicide it shall be no defense to the prosecution that
the Defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or
other consenual altercation, if during the course of the
duel, combat, or altercation any deadly weapon was used.
Subsection 2(c) of §76-2-402, U.C.A. provides that a
person is not justified in using force under the circumstances
specified in Paragraph 1, if he: "was the aggressor or was
engaged in a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from the
encounter..." (emphasis added).
First of all, whether or not the Appellant was the
aggressor or had agreed to engage in combat requires a factual
finding.

Instruction #10 is simply and clearly a misstatement of

the law and did not require the jury to find that Appellant was
-19-

an aggressor or fighting as a result of agreement, or as he
contended, justifiably defending himself and his friend.
As the Court noted in State v. Maritzsky, 104 Utah Adv.
Rep. 34, 39 (1989),
"Appellate Court's must review each case carefully to
prevent the infrequent meritorious claim from being
refexively swept into the tide of affirmance by the
chronicles of probability. Our job is not to mechanically apply the two-part standard set forth above, but
instead to focus upon the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding challenged."
Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is specific in this case: the state requested an instruction that
totally defeats Appellant's justification instruction the
instruction given was a mis-statement of the law and defense
counsel failed to object to its being given; an instruction,
which left the jury assuming that the justification defense did
not apply to "mutual combat" if a deadly weapon was used.
Appellant's justification instruction does not cure the defect.
Appellant was entitled to have the issues of (1) whether he consented to fight, rather than being forced into a gang fight by
circumstance, and (2) whether he was the aggressor, decided by a
well-informed jury.
Clearly counsel's deficient performance undermines your
confidence in the verdict against Appellant.

A reasonable proba-

bility existed that the jury's verdict would have been more
favorable to Appellant had the proper instruction been given.
The jury then would have been prepared to at least consider the
lesser included offenses contained in Instructions 8 and 9,
-20-

Court Record @ pg. 79, 80.
(c) Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel
when counsel formulated his theory of the case, presented that
theory to the jury, then abandoned that theory half-way through
Appellant's trial because he failed to properly investigate his
case prior to commencement of trial.
Defense counsel's opening statement begins with the
assertion that the Central City Cholos, a Chicano group of people
numbering between 25 to 27, carrying knives, guns and baseball
bats, was the gang opposing Appellant and his four friends.
(T.T.O pgs.

73, 76). He also asserted, at page 73, that either

Garza or Gomez was the President of the Cholo gang.
Shortly after the parties had concluded their opening
statements, the proceedings resumed in chambers out of the hearing of the jury.

The State expressed its concern with defense

counsel's argument during his opening that one of the State's
witnesses was head of the Central City Cholos.

The objection was

based on relevance and inappropriate character evidence (T.T.Q
pgs. 79, 80). Defense counsel attempted to argue that the existence of the gang affilication went to opportunity and motive, "a
Mexican gang as opposed to a bunch of people off the street."
(T.T.Q pg. 80) .
The prosecutor finally admitted that this evidence would
be relevant if there were a showing that Appellant and other
group members were aware of the affiliation. (T.T.Q pg. 81).
Defense counsel and the Court agreed, recognizing the requirement
-21-

on the defense to lay a proper foundation.
During eyewitness testimony, several witnesses alluded
to the gang affiliation.

Rumaldo Gomez testified that most of

the Chicano group were his people and that Appellant, a
Phillipino guy and the Luceros, were being called out (T.T.Q pg.
170).

Johnny Martinez testified that he did not see a baseball

bat in the hands of any member of "his group" (T.T.Q pg. 219).
He also testified that he observed Salazar fighting with two
individuals (T.T.Q pg. 220). Even the prosecutor made reference
to the "Lucero/Phillippino group" and the "other group." (T.T.Q
pg.

253). Further, the defense attorney reinforced the notion

that the witnesses knew of the gang affiliation when, examining
Victor Abergo, he asked what happened to the three Phillippinos
and the two Chicanos.

(T.T.Q pg. 259). The trial transcript is

riddled with gang affiliation references.
Not only was the gang affiliation recognized by the
State's witness, but defense witnesses as well.

For example,

Ranaldo Hain testified that "we not like the Cholo that jump people ten to one." (T.T.Q pg. 445).
Yet, in light of all the foundational requirements met
merely by witness testimony, defense counsel did not pursue his
theory of the case, to-wit: that Appellant was swept into a gang
war and justifiably shot one of its members.
In fact, defense counsel abandoned his theory of the
case before he even started the Defendant's case-in-chief.
Counsel told the Court, in chambers, that he "was not sure of
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(his client's) state of mind at the time... I would be willing to
abandon it rather than get into any further issue on it." (T.T.@
pg. 404).
This is the type of ill-prepared approach to criminal
defense work addressed in State v. Crestani, 106 Utah Adv. Rpts.
(March 30, 1989), relying on Strickland v. Washington, supra @
466 U.S. @ 680, 690-91, 104 S.Ct. @ 2060, 2066.
The evidence in the record is anything but clear and
uncontroverted with regards to Appellants, and gang members
state of minds.
Under Strickland:
The Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to
investigate, because reasonably effective assistance
must be based on professional decisions and informed
legal choices can be made only after investigation of
options.
These standards require no special amplification in
order to define counsel's duty to investigate, the duty
at issue in this case
Strategic choices made after
thought investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and
strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations
on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. @ 680, 690-91, 104
S.Ct. @ 2060, 2066 (emphasis added)
Cited in Cristani, supra @24.
Defense counsel had a duty to investigate his client's
state of mind at the time the event took place so he could properly prepare his client and present the facts. Further,
Appellant's state of mind was critical to the defense of
-23-

justification.

Defense counsel put the jury on notice that

Appellant became involuntarily involved in a gang war and was not
the aggressor•

He then failed to complete the foundational

requirements or pursue the issue of why Appellant was afraid for
his own life or that of his friend.

Without pursuing the gang

affiliation theory of the case, Appellant's defense became
meaningless.

The omissions by counsel that are alleged herein

are not the result of reasonable professional judgment.

Had

counsel thoroughly reviewed his case, interviewed his witnesses
and prepared his client for trial, the critical issue of the
Appellant's opportunity and state of mind would have been able to
be placed before the jury.

Without that information, the jury

had no other choice but than to convict Appellant as charged,
especially in light of Appellant's confession (albiet confused
because of the language barrier.)
Defense counsel further failed in his duties to effectively assist and represent Appellant by his failure to articulate grounds for admission of the "gang affiliation" evidence.
Rule 404(b) Utah Rules of Evidence provides that:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Evidence of the witnesses' affiliation with gang and gang wars
was critical in order to establish proof of motive, opportunity
to leave the scene, intent to commit murder, preparation, plan,
-24-

knowledge or absence of mistake or accident.

It is unforgivable

that this evidence was not made available to the jury.
Further, Rule 406, Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine
practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not
and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with
the habit or routine practice.
The frequency of gang wars, the parties' participation in same
and the routine practice of these gangs in dealing with disputes,
such as the one involved herein, would have given the jury necessary information with regards to resolving the issues of
aggression and justification.

The picture painted without this

information left no doubt in the juryfs mind that Appellant committed the crime as charged.

Appellant could not of, nor did he

get, a fair trial without this information having been provided
to the jury.
Finally, defense counsel failed to invoke Rule 6 08(c),
Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides:
Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of
the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.
Why didn't defense counsel ask both Garza and Gomez
whether their association with the Central City Cholos would
affect their ability to be candid and honest?

Why did he not ask

them whether they were even affiliated with this or any other
group or gang?
I suggest that if defense counsel had properly investigated his case, he would have been able to get that evidence
-25-

before the jury or devise a theory of the case without it, but
before Appellant's matter came on for jury trial.

The manner in

which the defense presented its case denied Appellant a fair
trial.
ISSUE NO, Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT HIS HOUSE WAS SET ON FIRE TWO
DAYS AFTER THE SHOOTING.
Approximately two days after the shooting of Todd
Salazar, Appellant's house was set on fire (T.T.Q 314).
Appellant's attorney attempted to establish the fact of the fire
by questioning a police officer who had knowledge of same (T.T.@
pg. 311).
Subsequently, during an in chamber proceeding, the prosecutor objected to any further reference of the fire on grounds
of relevancy. (T.T.Q pg. 314). Defense counsel argued that the
evidence of the fire was relevant and tends to establish why
Appellant did not go home after the shooting, to-wit: "the volite
situation was the very reason," and why Appellant behaved the way
he did the night of the shooting. (T.T.Q pg. 315). Further,
counsel argued that the fact of the fire was "supportive of the
very feelings (Appellant) had" the night of the shooting. (T.T.@
pg- 316).
The Court ruled that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed any relevance, and was therefore not admissible.
(T.T.Q pg. 316).
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
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guarantees a criminal Defendant the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses.

"Cross-examination is the principal

means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of
his testimony are tested."
(1974).

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316

"The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation requires

only that the accused be permitted to introduce all relevant and
admissible evidence."

State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah

1980) .
In light of the inferences from witnesses concerning the
various relationships between the players, such as the gang
affiliation; and Appellant's theory of the case concerning justifiable homicide and/or accident, the issue of the fire that
burned Appellant's house shortly after the gang fight was very
relevant as to his intent, preparation plan, knowledge or absence
of mistake or accident on the night of the shooting.
Appellant did not return home after the shooting because
he was afraid of the Mexican gang members and what they would do
to him.

After all, the only reason Appellant was involved in the

first place was because he attempted to stop an otherwise explosive situation.

He knew the Cholos were mad at him, just like he

knew the Cholos bombed his house in retaliation.
The trial Court abused its discretion in not allowing
Appellant to continue to apprise the jury of all the facts relevant to the fight that occured the night of the shooting, including the bombing of his house.
-27-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court failed to give an eyewitness cautionary
instruction, and as a result, committed plain error.

The defense

counsel's failure to ask for this instruction constituted deficient performance that prejudiced the Defendant and denied him
his Sixth Amendment Right to effective assistance of counsel.
The jury in this case was never informed that the process of proceeding events and remembering them is not as simple or as certain as turning on a camera and recording everything the camera
sees on tape or film for later replay.
Appellant's entire defense hinged upon accident and/or
justification with regards to the shooting of Todd Salazar.
Virtually all of the evidence admitted during his trial with
regards to the events surrounding the shooting was introduced
through eyewitness testimony.

The jury was completely left in

the dark as to the complex process through which witnesses
perceive, remember and recollect.

Additionally, because most of

the witnesses that testified at Appellant's trial all had limited
language skills, the reasons for requiring the Court to give a
cautionary instruction were enhanced.

Appellant was denied

effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.

His failure

to request the eyewitness instruction, along with his failure to
object to Instruction Number 10, constituted said ineffective
assistance of counsel.

Instruction 10 completely eliminated the
-28-

failure to properly investigate his case resulted in the
Appellant being denied a fair trial. Additionally, Appellant's
attorneys failure to articulate reasons for admission of the gang
affiliation evidence with regards to the Rules of Evidence was
blatantly ineffective.

Defendant-Appellant's defense of justifi-

cation became meaningless in light of the fact that gang
affiliation issues were never raised to the jury, the instructions given to the jury were completely wrong and his attorney
failed to adequately investigate the case or to prepare his client for testifying during the trial, and as a result thereof, had
to abandon his only defense to the crime charged.
DATED this 7th day of May, 1990.

GARY L. GALE
Attorney at Law

"

"
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I do hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to: David L. Wilkinson, Attorney
General, State of Utah, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, on this 8th day of May, 1990.

RANDINE SALERNO
Attorney at Law
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IN JTHE-.irST$ICT COURT OF

^t^V^

WEBER

EHer

State

)

vs.
DANILO DELACRUZ PASCUAL

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND
COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE
PRISON
No, 19045

Defendant.
—00O00—

Defendant having been convicted by

[X] a jury;

[ ] the court; [ ] plea of guilty;

CI plea of no contest; of the offense of ^ ^ N H g g ^ ^ m € m :
.*
felony of t h e ' ^ £ £ £ degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence,
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows:
THE BASIC SENTENCE
] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison;
J U — n o t less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison;
$ 3 not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison;
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $
.

f ^ l

ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
"(Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows:
0 3 one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1), $&k}9Cc63i; Consecutive;
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3);
[ ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison,
pursuant to 76-3-203(4);
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above.
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the
defendant is sentenced to:
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison,
RESTITUTION
(K$ Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $3.530.25
> to
Office of Crims Victim Reparations - $2,718.67 & Jose Salazar - $811.58.
efendant is remanded into custody of:
5 5 the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or
[ ] the Warden for execution of this sentence.
DATED this 3rd

ST:

BENJAMIN SIMsV

day of

January

DISTRICT COURT
S S S a ^ Clerk
Deputy Clerk

JUDGE
11. TAYLOR

124
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1J' CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the
votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenL ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of
the death or other constitutional disability of the
President.—The person having the greatest number
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be ehgibie to that of Vice-President of the
Umted States.
AMENDMENT X m
Sectioa
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, 3hall exist within the
Umted States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection ]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
3. [Disqualification to hold office ]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be
paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the Umted
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Umted States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the Umted States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the nght to

* Amend. XVI

vote at any election for the choice of electors for *resident and Vice-President of the Umted States, r" epresentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legisl ature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabita its of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the Umted States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be redu< ed in
the proportion which the number of such mali citizens shall bear to the whole number of male en ozena
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representat ve in
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice Pres dent,
or hold any office, civil or military, under the L nited
States, or under any State, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or is an
officer of the Umted States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial cfficer
of any State, to support the Constitution of the
Umted States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comi art to
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a v )te of
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned —
Debts of the Confederacy and c aims
not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the Umted S bates,
authorized by law, including debts incurred foi payment of pensions and bounties for services m suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the Umted States nor any State
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the L nited
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipat on of
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and c aims
shall be held illegal and void.
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color i tot to
disqualify]
2. [Power to enforce amendment]
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Ra :e or
color not to disqualify.]
The nght of citizens of the Umted States tc vote
shall not be demed or abndged by the Umted £ states
or by any State on account of race, color,, or pre vious
condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVT
[Income tax.]
The Congress 3hall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source deived,
without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumention.

Art I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

accused of the commission of a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a
previous felony charge, and where the proof is evident or the presumption strong.
1973
[Offenses bailable.] [Proposed.]

(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony
charge; or
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by"
statute, when there is substantial evidence to
support the charge ^ncpfiie court finds by clear"
~ancT convincing evidence that the person would
constitute a substantial clanger to self or any
"Utherperson or to the community or is likely to
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on
bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal only as prescribed by law.
[1989]
Sec. 9.

[Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
1896

Sec. 10. [Trial b y jury.]
In capital cases the nght of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
1896
Sec. 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
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person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
1896

S e c 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature.
1949

S e c 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden —
Issuance of warrant.]
The nght of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly descnbmg
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
1896
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press —
Libel]
No law shall be passed to abndge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press. In all cnminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the nght
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
S e c 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no impnsonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors.
1896
S e c 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the nght of suffrage. Soldiers, in time
of war, may vote at their post of duty, m or out of the
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law
1896

Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896

S e c 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in
levying war against it, or m adhenng to its enemies
S e c 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
nght to appear and defend in person and by couna&L- convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
1896
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation witnesses to the same overt act.
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to t h e civil
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
power.]
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attenThe military shall be in stnct subordination to the
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be
public tnaj_by_qn i m p a r t s ) IUTV of the county or dlS- quartered m any house without the consent of the
tnct inwhich the nffkna* is alleged to have been com- owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be
nutted, and the nght to appeal in all cases In no prescribed by law.
ISM
^instance shall any accused person, before finaTjudgi
^nJgnTTbe compelled to advance money or tees" to se- S e c 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
cure the n^hts herein guaranteed. The accused shall
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus- have been duly convicted, shall exist within this
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any S t a t e .
1896
party.
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fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT VH
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVT

[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the nght of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.-

AMENDMENT I
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the nght of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

AMENDMENT VIH
[Bail — Punishment]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.

AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the nght of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

AMENDMENT DC
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT m
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, m time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but m a manner to be prescribed by law
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The nght of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or m the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger, nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the nght to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-

AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XI
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial
power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit m law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XII
[Election of President and Vice-President]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate;-—The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted,—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
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(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of minors by parents, guardians, teachers,
or other persons in loco parentis;
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of persons in custody under the laws of
the state;
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for
any other reason under the laws of this state.
1973

3-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible
felony defined.
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using
irce against another when and to the extent that he
sasonabiy believes that such force is necessary to
efend himself or a third person against such other's
nminent use of unlawful force; however, a person is
istifled in using force which is intended or likely to
ause death or serious bodily injury only if he reasonbly believes that the force is necessary to prevent
eath or serious bodily injury to himself or a third
erson, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felny
(2) A person is not justified in using force under
he circumstances specified in paragraph (1) of this
ection if he:
(a) Initially provokes the use of force against
himself with the intent to use force as an excuse
to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant, or
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing, or
fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a
") combaTby agreement, unless he withdraws from
£ the encounter and effectively communicates to
\ such other person his intent to do so and the
/ , other notwithstanding continues or threatens to
continue the use of unlawful force.
(3) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony
includes aggravated assault, mayhem, murder m the
first and second degree and manslaughter, kidnapmg, and aggravated kidnaping, rape, forcible sodomy,
and aggravated sexual assault, as they are defined in
chapter 5 of this code, and also includes arson, robbery, and burglary, as defined in chapter 6 of this
code. Any other felony offense which involves the use
of force or violence against a person so as to create a
substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury
also constitutes a forcible felony Burglary of a vehicle, as defined in Section 76-6-204, shall not constitute a forcible felony except where the vehicle is occupied at the time unlawful entry is made or attempted.
1974

76-2-403. Force in arrest.
Any person is justified in using any force, except
deadly force, which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an arrest or to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making an arrest. 1973

(l) the officer has probable cause to believe
t h a t the suspect has committed a felony offense involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of death or serious bodily injury; or
(n) the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of death or
serious bodily injury to the officer or to
others if apprehension is delayed;
(c) the officer reasonably believes that the use
of deadly force is necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily injury to the officer or another person.
(2) If feasible, a verbal warning should be given by
the officer prior to any use of deadly force under Subsection (l)(b) or (l)(c).
MST
76-2-405.

Force in defense of habitation.

(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon
his habitation; however, he is justified in the use of
force which is intended or likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury only if:
(a) the entry is made or attempted m a violent
and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by
stealth, and he reasonably believes that the
entry is attempted or made for the purpose of
assaulting or offering personal violence to any
person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and
he reasonably believes that the force is necessary
to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence, or
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is
made or attempted for the purpose of committing
a felony in the habitation and that the force is
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense of habitation is presumed for the purpose of
both civil and criminal cases to have acted reasonably
and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death
or serious bodily injury if the entry or attempted
entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of
force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony.
1985
76-2-406. Force in d e f e n s e of property.
A person is justified in using force, other t h a n
deadly force, against another when and to the extent
t h a t he reasonably believes t h a t force is necessary to
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real
property or personal property:

(1) Lawfully in his possession; or
(2) Lawfully in the possession of a member =of
his immediate family; or

76-2-404. Peace officer's use of deadly force.
( D A peace officer, or any person acting by his command in his aid and assistance, is justified in using
deadly force when:
(a) the officer is acting in obedience to and in
accordance with the judgment of a competent
court in executing a penalty of death;

(3) Belonging to a person whose property he
has a legal duty to protect.
1973

(b) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape
from custody following an arrest, where the officer reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by
escape, and

Part
1. Classification of offenses,
2. Sentencing.
3. Fines and special sanctions.»
4. Limitations and special provisions on sentences.

CHAPTER 3
PUNISHMENTS

Rule 404
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Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to
prove conduct; exceptions;
other
crimes.
(a) Character e v i d e n c e generally. Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of his character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a per
tinent trait of his character offered by an ac
cused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same,
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607,
608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, w r o n g s , or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove theCchaja^tex^La personam order to show that
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident
Rule 405. Methods of proving character.
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which
evidence of character or a trait of character of a peison is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into
relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in
which character or a trait of character of a person is
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of his conduct.
'
V
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Rule 406. Habit; routine practice.
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine
practice of an organization, whether corroborated or
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or
organization on a particular occasion was in confermity with the habit or routine practice.
Rule 407. S u b s e q u e n t remedial m e a s u r e s .
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if
taken previously, would have made the event less
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offenng or promising
to furnish, or (2) accepting or offenng or promising to
accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or
its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made
in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is
presented in the course of compromise negotiations.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the
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evidence is> offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution
Rule 409. P a y m e n t of medical and similar expenses.
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to
pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned
by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for
the injury.
Rule 410. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements.
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence
of the following is not, in any civil or cnminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made
the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions.
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) a plea of nolo contendere;
(3) any statement made in the course of any
proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Cnmmal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas, or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea
discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting
authonty which do not result in a plea of guilty
or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible d) in any
proceeding wherein another statement made in the
course of the same plea or plea discussions has been
introduced and the statement ought in fairness be
considered contemporaneously with it, or (n) in a
criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if
the statement was made by the defendant under oath,
on the record and in the presence of counsel.
Rule 411. Liability insurance.
Evidence that a person was or was not insured
against liability is not admissible upon the issue
whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for
another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership,
or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
Rule 412. [Reserved.]
ARTICLE V.
PRIVILEGES.
Rule 501. Privilege; general rule.
Pnvilege is governed by the common law, except as
modified by statute or court rule.
ARTICLE VI.
WITNESSES.
Rule 601. General rule of competency.
(a) General rule of competency. Every person is
competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.
(b) Statement of declarant in action for his
wrongful death. Evidence of a statement by the deceased is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
offered against the plaintiff in an action for wrongful
death.
(c) Statement of d e c e d e n t offered in action
against his estate.
(1) Evidence of a statement* is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in an
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action upon a claim or demand against the estate
of the declarant if the statement was made upon
the personal knowledge of the declarant at a time
when the matter had been recently perceived by
him and while his recollection was clear
(2) Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this section if the statement was made under
circumstances such as to indicate its lack of
trustworthiness.'
Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge.
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding
that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not,
consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This
rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating
to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.
Rule 603. Oath or affirmation.
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to
declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken
his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to
do so.
Rule 604. Interpreters.
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these
rules relating to qualification as an expert and the
administration of an oath or affirmation that he will
make a true translation.
Rule 605. Competency of judge as witness.
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in
that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in
order to preserve the point.
Rule 606. Competency of juror as witness.
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not
testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the
case m which he is sitting as a juror If he is called so
to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict
or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
his or any other juror'3 mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on
the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit
or evidence of any statement by him concerning a
matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
Rule 607. Who may impeach.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him.
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of
witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character
is admissible only after the character of the witness

Rule 609

for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting his credibility, other than
conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however,
in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concenung
the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of
another witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or
by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of
his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to
credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the
witness either by examination of the witness or by
evidence otherwise adduced.
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from
him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting tins
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this
rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten
years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent
gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the
use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate
of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been
the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted,
and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile
adjudications is generally not admissible under this
rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness
other than the accused if conviction of the offense
would be admissible to attack the credibility of <ui
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.

